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Non‐Technical Summary 
As a result of the global economic recession there  is renewed  interest  in the effects of taxation on 
economic performance: many countries attempted to use tax cuts as a means to stimulate aggregate 
demand and now require future tax increases to reduce large public sector deficits partly in response 
to  the crisis. Correctly  forecasting  the  short‐run output effects and  the  long‐run growth  impact of 
such tax changes  is central from a policy perspective.  In practice however, this task  is complex: tax 
changes affect output through a number of transmission channels, and they impact both on demand 
and supply conditions.  
There is a large empirical literature estimating the effects of tax changes ex‐post that is a potentially 
useful source of  information  for policy makers. These studies can be broadly grouped according to 
whether  they  present  structural  estimates,  which  mostly  refer  to  the  medium‐  and  long‐run 
relationships and employ panel methods, or whether  they are based on  time  series  for particular 
countries, generally refer to shorter run effects, make few structural assumptions and are primarily 
based on vector auto regressions. Both strands of the  literature and the short‐ and  long‐run effects 
of  tax  changes  are  usually  considered  separately,  even  though  from  a  policy  perspective  and  to 
understand potential trade‐offs, this division is not justified. However, irrespective of this distinction 
a general conclusion would be that, while most studies agree that changes in at least some types of 
taxation  are  associated with  changes  in  growth  rates  or  output  levels  in  the  short  and  long  run, 
studies neither agree on the magnitude nor on the direction of the effects.  
The objective of this paper  is to summarize and to evaluate existing ex‐post evidence on the short‐ 
and  long‐run  output  effects  (i.e.  short‐run  tax multipliers  and  long‐run  growth  effects)  effects  of 
changes  in  taxation  from  the point of  view of  a policy maker  in  an OECD  country who wishes  to 
predict the output effects of a tax reform ex‐ante. For this reason we propose a set of criteria against 
which we evaluate existing evidence that will ensure distinctness from a more traditional  literature 
review.  In particular, a given parameter estimate  is useful  for predicting  the effects of  tax  reforms 
according to whether 1) it is relevant, 2) it can be replicated and 3) it is robust and reliable. While it is 
relatively  straight  forward  to  determine  whether  a  particular  study  is  relevant  and  whether  the 
results are robust, determining whether the tax reforms can be replicated turns out to be much more 
complex  and  requires  the papers  to  recognize  the  government budget  constraint  in  the  empirical 
specification  (that  every  fiscal  change  needs  to  be  somehow  offset  by  some  compensating  fiscal 
item) among other issues. By applying these criteria we narrow down the number of papers that we 
consider as useful  for policy. We  include  in  the paper detailed  summary  tables  that allow a more 
systematic and enlightened comparison of conflicting estimates between papers.  
Overall, our review suggests that based on the literature surveyed, at least the direction of the long‐
run and to a lesser extent of short‐run output responses to tax changes can be predicted with some 
degree  of  certainty. While  the magnitudes  of  the  estimated  long‐run  output  effects  differ,  these 
differences  can  often  be  attributed  to  differences  in  the measurement  of  the  tax  burden  or  the 
assumed offsetting change. In contrast to this, differences  in terms of the magnitude of time series 
studies  are  often  more  difficult  to  reconcile.  In  addition,  the  long‐run  literature  generally  takes 
greater care to  identify the exact fiscal change underlying the estimates contrary to the time series 
literature.  Our  review  also  suggests  that  there  may  be  trade‐offs  between  short‐run  output 
stabilization  and  long‐run  growth  depending  on  the  tax  reform  considered,  but  more  research 
focusing on this question is required. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Im  Zuge  der  globalen  Rezession  lässt  sich  wieder  ein  deutlich  stärkeres  Interesse  an  den 
volkswirtschaftlichen  Effekten  von  Steuerreformen  beobachten:  eine  große  Zahl  von  Ländern  hat 
versucht, mit Hilfe von Steuersenkungen die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage zu stimulieren, so dass 
in  naher  Zukunft  Steuererhöhungen  zur  Senkung  der  öffentlichen  Verschuldung  unausweichlich 
erscheinen. Die Vorhersage der kurzfristigen Outputeffekte und der Auswirkungen auf  langfristiges 
Wachstum von Steuerreformen erscheint aus wirtschaftspolitischer Perspektive daher elementar. In 
der  Praxis  ist  dies  allerdings  nicht  einfach:  Steueränderungen  beeinflussen  potentiell  die 
gesamtwirtschaftliche  Nachfrage  und  können  außerdem  unterschiedliche  angebotsseitige  Effekte 
haben.  
Es existieren viele Studien, die die Effekte von Steueränderungen empirisch ex‐post schätzen, und die 
eine  potenziell  wichtige  Informationsquelle  darstellen.  Diese  lassen  sich  grob  in  zwei  Kategorien 
einteilen.  In  der  einen  werden  die  mittel‐  und  langfristigen  Outputeffekte  auf  Basis  von 
Paneldatensätzen  geschätzt.  In  der  anderen  Kategorie  werden  vor  allem  die  kurzfristigen 
Outputeffekte auf Basis von Zeitreihen einzelner Länder geschätzt. Beide Literaturbereiche werden 
typischerweise getrennt betrachtet, obwohl aus einer wirtschaftspolitischen Perspektive dies nicht 
gerechtfertigt erscheint, da sich so etwaige Zielkonflikte zwischen kurz‐ und langfristigen Zielen nicht 
identifizieren  lassen.  Während  die  meisten  Studien  unabhängig  von  dieser  Unterteilung 
übereinstimmend  zeigen,  dass  Outputeffekte  als  Folge  von  Steuerreformen  auftreten,  herrscht 
jedoch kein Konsens in punkto Größe und Richtung dieser Effekte. 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie besteht darin, die bestehenden Schätzungen  zu den kurzfristigen 
Steuermultiplikatoren  und  den  langfristigen  Wachstumseffekten  zusammenzufassen  und  zu 
beurteilen,  ob  sie  für  die  Vorhersage  von  kurz‐  und  langfristigen  Outputeffekten  zukünftiger 
Steueränderungen  in OECD Ländern geeignet sind. In diesem Zusammenhang spielen vor allem drei 
zentrale  Faktoren  eine  Rolle.  Erstens  müssen  die  Ergebnisse  relevant  sein,  das  heißt,  dass  die 
Schätzungen  auf  Basis  von  neueren  OECD‐Daten  vorgenommen  wurden.  Zweitens  muss  bei  den 
Studien Klarheit herrschen, welche Art von Steuerreform den Schätzungen  zugrunde  liegt,  so dass 
diese theoretisch replizierbar sind. Drittens müssen die Ergebnisse robust sein. Die Bestimmung, ob 
eine  Schätzung  replizierbar  ist,  ist  am  komplexesten  und  erfordert  u.a.,  dass  die  Studien  klar 
definieren,  welche  Steuerreformen  genau  den  Schätzungen  zugrunde  liegen,  wie  sie  finanziert 
werden und welche anderen fiskalpolitischen Variablen im Zuge der Steuerreform geändert werden. 
Durch Anwendung dieser Kriterien reduziert sich die Anzahl der Studien, deren Schätzungen  in der 
Praxis  brauchbar  sind.  In  detaillierte  Tabellen  werden  die  Studien  zusammengefasst,  die  einen 
systematischen Vergleich von sich widersprechenden Schätzungen erlauben.  
Die Bewertung der Schätzungen zeigt, dass auf Basis der zusammengefassten Literatur zumindest die 
Richtung  der  Outputeffekte  von  Steueränderungen  mit  relativ  großer  Wahrscheinlichkeit 
vorhergesagt werden kann. Unterschiede bei der Höhe der  langfristigen Wachstumseffekte können 
oft  durch  Unterschiede  bei  den  Steuervariablen  oder  durch  unterschiedliche  Annahmen  bei  der 
Finanzierung  von  Steuerreformen  erklärt  werden.  Demgegenüber  sind  Unterschiede  bei  den 
geschätzten  kurzfristigen  Steuermultiplikatoren  schwerer  erklärbar,  und  die  zugrunde  liegenden 
Steuerreformen sind hier oft nicht klar identifizierbar. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie weisen zudem auf 
mögliche  Zielkonflikte  zwischen dem  Ziel der  kurzfristigen Outputstabilisierung und der  Förderung 
langfristigen Wachstums hin, die möglicherweise bei bestimmten Steuerreformen auftreten können. 
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1 Introduction 
Given the large and predominantly debt-financed public spending increases in response to the recent 
global economic crisis, in many OECD countries major adjustments in taxation have either already been 
implemented or are likely in the near future. Understanding and correctly forecasting the effects of 
changes to the level and structure of taxation on output levels and output growth (which we term ‘output 
effects’) ex-ante is, as a consequence, essential for governments. The output effects are not only relevant 
for the design and choice of tax reforms, but also to evaluate potential trade-offs with equity-related or 
other objectives that policy makers might seek to pursue. In practice however, this task is complex: tax 
changes affect output through a number of transmission channels, and they impact both on demand and 
supply conditions. There is a large empirical literature estimating the effects of tax changes ex-post that is 
a potentially useful source of information for policy makers. The objective of this paper is to summarize 
and to evaluate existing ex-post evidence on the short- and long-run output effects (i.e. short-run tax 
multipliers and long-run growth effects) effects of changes in taxation from the point of view of a policy 
maker in an OECD country who wishes to predict the output effects of a tax reform ex-ante.4  
 
Empirical studies that analyze the growth effects of tax reforms can be broadly grouped according to 
whether they present structural estimates, which mostly refer to the medium- and long-run relationships 
and employ panel methods, or whether they are based on time series for particular countries, generally 
refer to shorter run effects, make few structural assumptions and are primarily based on vector auto 
regressions. Both strands of the literature and the short- and long-run effects of tax changes are usually 
considered separately, even though from a policy perspective and to understand potential trade-offs, this 
division is not justified. However, irrespective of this distinction a general conclusion would be that, while 
most studies agree that changes in at least some types of taxation are associated with changes in growth 
rates or output levels in the short and long run, estimates differ widely in terms of the magnitude and even 
in terms of the sign of the impact (whether increased taxation lowers or raises output and growth), 
although to a lesser extent.  
 
From an academic perspective this raises the question of what might explain this parameter 
heterogeneity.5 From a policy perspective, while the robustness of the parameter estimate is of course 
important, an alternative set of criteria might be used to judge the usefulness of a given study however. 
                                                 
4 We recognize that there are general concerns about using ex-post estimates to forecast the effects of tax changes (see for 
example Auerbach, 2009). However, we abstract from these issues in this paper.   
5 There are already several papers that review the existing evidence of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy which can be 
classified according to which aspect of fiscal policy they focus on, whether they consider short-run or long-run effects and which 
macroeconomic effects (i.e. which macroeconomic variable) they consider. Hall (2009) reviews the evidence of the short-run impact 
of public spending on output. Romp and de Haan (2007) and Straub (2008) focus on the long-run output effects of public investment. 
Hebous (2009) reviews the short-run impact of various fiscal policy shocks on the macroeconomy more generally. Gemmell (2004) 
summarizes the existing literature on fiscal policy and long-run growth at that time from an academic perspective.  
 
3 
 
We order our criteria for selecting whether a given parameter estimate is of value for predicting the effects 
of tax reforms according to whether it can be replicated by government and is econometrically robust. 
While it is relatively straight forward to agree on a set of criteria against which researchers would be willing 
to describe an estimated parameter value as robust (it should be free from endogeneity bias for example), 
determining whether the tax reforms can be replicated turns out to be much more complex. Often papers 
deal with issues of econometric robustness but do not consider whether their implicit policy choices are 
replicable by policy makers. 
 
In principle replicability of any empirical estimate of tax reforms therefore requires identifying the tax policy 
change that took place, at least in broad terms. Generally speaking, tax changes can be distinguished by 
the type of tax involved and by whether the change affects the level (revenue changing effects), the tax 
mix (share of each tax in total revenue) and the structure of a particular tax (its progressivity). For time 
series studies, indentifying the exact tax change underlying the estimates is mostly not feasible as they 
consider changes to some measure of total revenue. However, it may be possible to justify this based on 
the possibility that alternative tax changes have identical output effects over the short run.  
 
In addition, key within the framework we adopt to judge replicability is that no tax change can be 
understood in isolation.6 Changes in the level of any given tax must be financed by changes to some other 
tax, changes to government expenditure, or a change in the budget deficit, and may be associated with a 
change to the progressivity of taxation, or perhaps more likely some combination of all of those. Changes 
to taxation therefore imply (compensating) changes to other aspects of fiscal policy, which themselves 
may have an effect on output levels and growth, thereby reinforcing or offsetting the output effects of the 
original tax change. The outcomes from a particular policy change may, in this sense, be unique, and this 
is why parameter estimates on tax variables vary across different studies (in addition to endogeneity bias 
or changes in the sample of countries). Recognizing that another aspect of fiscal policy must change when 
a particular aspect of taxation changes does not imply that a single parameter estimate derived from any 
particular study is more or less ‘correct’ than another; each will capture the effect on growth of a change in 
that fiscal variable offset by some other changes. It does however imply that some studies produce 
parameter estimates that are more useful for policy forecasting the output effects from a given tax change. 
In principle, this implies that a given parameter estimate is only useful for forecasting growth outcomes if it 
is possible to identify and therefore replicate what the combination of other compensating fiscal changes 
were, although we make some exceptions to this general rule. 
 
Related to this point is our interest to be able to compare the output level and growth effects from different 
compensating changes. The ability to identify what compensating changes are implied by a particular 
regression equation allows us to compare between the alternative compensating policy choices that arise 
                                                 
6 Unless it is assumed that the tax variables of interest is the only fiscal policy change that can affect growth. The existing empirical 
evidence would lead one to argue against such a view. 
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out of a given tax change. In a perfect world there would exist a menu of other possible changes to fiscal 
policy for each possible tax change, such that the effects from these points in the policy space could be 
accurately compared and then applied. Unfortunately, the empirical literature is not yet at such a point that 
would allow us to construct a menu of choices, but we are able to at least identify some points on that 
menu.  
 
In contrast to analyzing the extent to which tax reforms can be replicated, analyzing the robustness and 
the reliability of the econometric estimates is relatively straight forward. We apply standard criteria and 
examine whether panel studies control for endogeneity, and whether unobserved heterogeneity is likely to 
represent a problem. For time series studies, we examine some aspects of the econometric specifications 
including the identification strategy that affect the results. For both types of studies, we ignore 
specifications with coefficients that are not significant (which are however clearly outnumbered by those 
specifications with significant results).  
 
By applying these criteria we narrow down the number of papers that we consider as useful for policy. We 
also present detailed summary tables which allow a more systematic and enlightened comparison of 
conflicting estimates between papers. Overall, our review suggests that at least the direction of the long-
run growth response to tax changes can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. While the 
magnitudes of the estimated long-run output effects differ, these differences can often be attributed to 
differences in the measurement of the tax burden or the assumed offsetting change. Most time series 
studies also agree in terms of the direction of the output effects, but differences in terms of the magnitude 
are often more difficult to reconcile. In addition, it is generally harder to identify the exact fiscal change 
underlying the estimates contrary compared to panel studies making them less useful for policy purposes. 
Our review also suggests that there may be trade-offs between short-run output stabilization and long-run 
growth depending on the tax reform considered, but more research focusing on this question is required.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the criteria that we use to select studies that we 
include in this review which are then evaluated based on the criteria of replicability and reliability. We 
consider both studies that estimate the long-run growth effects of taxation as well as studies that estimate 
short-run tax multipliers. Section 3 discusses the replicability of the results and in particular measurement 
issues of tax changes as well as whether studies have considered how changes in taxation are offset. 
Section 4 evaluates the econometric methods used and the robustness of the result. Based on our 
analysis about which specifications in the selected studies are useful to predict the output effects, we then 
present the exact empirical estimates of the output effects over the long and the short run from the 
literature in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and points out directions for further policy-relevant research. 
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2 Some Preliminaries 
One explanation for the lack of robustness of the estimated effects of tax reforms across studies would be 
standard econometric issues such as differences in the definitions of fiscal policy between countries 
(measurement bias) and differences in the effects across countries (heterogeneity) in the case of panel 
studies for example. Such issues are clearly important. In order to minimize the effects of heterogeneity 
and measurement bias at the outset we therefore mostly concentrate on studies based on data from 
developed countries only and for instance exclude paper like Lee and Gordon (2005) who use data from 
developed and developing countries.  
 
We also only discuss studies from around the previous decade of research. This criterion is based on the 
assumption that a) more recent studies are of better quality because they are more likely to employ 
advanced econometric techniques and that b) more recent evidence is also likely based on more recent 
data and therefore more relevant for contemporaneous policy making. We also exclude studies that only 
measure the effects of government size on output, or studies that estimate only the indirect impact of 
various fiscal policy variables on output (i.e. studies that estimate the effects of fiscal policy on private 
investment or human capital accumulation for example).  
 
The time horizon for the forecast of the effects of tax reforms matters because there is much theoretical 
evidence that suggests that the effects of changes in taxation differ over the short and the long run. 
Broadly we include studies that use period averages of the data (most typically 5 years) or dynamic panel 
data methods with annual data and that calculate long-run coefficients and label these as “long-run 
studies” or “panel studies”. Those that examine shorter time horizons we group as “short-run studies” or 
“time series studies”. A second reason for distinguishing between these strands of the literature is based 
on the observation that most of the time series studies pay little attention to potential long-run effects of 
taxation in the sense that they never distinguish productive from non-productive spending and on occasion 
(for instance Mertens and Ravn, 2009) assume that tax shocks are not permanent. For these short-run 
studies the growth effects of taxation are typically studied up to 3 years. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the papers that we review.  
3 Replicability 
3.1 Measures of the Tax Burden and the Tax Changes in Panel 
Studies 
This sub-section reviews the measures of the tax burden in panel studies. The way the tax burden is 
measured matters for two reasons. First, it is debatable what type of measure captures best the growth 
effects of taxation. One simplifying assumption often made as outlined above is that the growth effects of 
taxation are fully captured by a single variable, the measure of the ‘implicit’ average tax rate (the revenue 
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derived from a given tax as a ratio to GDP). We might anticipate that growth is instead affected by the 
level of taxation (i.e. the revenue derived), the mix of taxes (i.e. the contribution of different taxes to the 
overall tax burden) and aspects of the structure of each tax (their progressivity). Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002), Devereux et al. (2008) and Myles (2007) all argue that other measures of taxation, such as the 
effective average tax rate and statutory tax rates, better reflect the ‘real’ tax burden. Second, the choice of 
the tax variable further determines what specific change in taxation is being considered. Using imprecise 
tax measures may imply that the tax change cannot be replicated and is therefore not useful for policy in 
practice.  
 
It is not clear what the relevant measures of progressivity that one should consider are. The review by 
Myles (2007, p 89) succinctly summarizes both the importance and the empirical difficulties of this: 
“What should matter for the economic outcome is the distortion caused by the tax (how much it 
changes decisions). An aggregate measure of the tax rate can never capture the varying degrees 
of distortion that individuals or firms with different incomes will face. […] it still remains the case 
that all of the regressions are limited by the fact that they are unable to work with the rate of tax 
that affects individual decisions. For decisions at the margin we would think of the marginal rate of 
tax as being important. But there are discrete choices (such as choice of location) for which the 
average rate matters. What the regressions end up using is an aggregate average rate, or 
constructed marginal rate, that probably does not affect the rate that any particular economic 
decision maker is facing.” 
As already noted, many previous studies have mostly relied on implicit average tax rates (IATRs) 
measured using tax revenue data either as a share of GDP (e.g. Kneller et al., 1999; Bleaney et al., 2001, 
Arin, 2004; Aiginger and Falk, 2005; Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008; Benos, 2009). Others have 
alternatively calculated ‘effective’ rates, tax revenue data as ratios of the relevant tax base such as 
personal incomes or corporate profits (Padovano and Galli, 2002; Angelopoulos et al., 2007; Romero-
Ávila and Strauch, 2008). A smaller number have reported tax-growth effects using statutory tax rates 
(e.g. Wildmalm, 2001; Angelopoulos et al., 2007). We might think of these as capturing the level and 
structure effects of taxation to different degrees. There is more sophisticated data available on effective 
tax rates (for instance provided by Devereux et al., 2009). However, their use in panel studies will only be 
possible once longer time series are available. Arnold (2008) reports the effects of changes in the shares 
of particular taxes in total revenue.  
 
Given the discussion from the literature we might consider IATR measures are capturing more of the level 
effects than effects from the structure of taxation, while statutory tax rates as capturing relatively more 
information about the structure than the level. We view effective tax rates as most likely laying between 
these two. However, to some extent all capture the growth effects that occur from changes in the level of 
taxation. This justifies that we choose to ignore from the tables that summarize the estimates (Tables 2 to 
5) those studies that include only a small number of other fiscal variables irrespective of whether the tax 
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variable are IATR measures, effective tax rates or statutory tax rates because in these cases, the 
offsetting fiscal change is not clear. 
 
Assuming that both the level and the progressivity of taxation have non-zero output effects (the discussion 
is typically framed in relation to distortionary taxes), and assuming there is a tendency for both to be 
altered at the same time, then there will be an omitted variable bias of an unknown direction on the 
included tax variables (depending on whether they have a tendency to both become more distortionary at 
the same time, or whether they move in opposite directions). If the structure of taxation and the level of 
taxes are usually moved in the same direction, both become more distortionary, then by omitting the 
relevant measures of the structure of taxes, the level of taxes may pick up part or all of the structure’s 
growth effect. It is in effect this form of omitted variable bias that the proponents of using non-IATR 
measures are assuming. Alternatively it is equally plausible that the level and structure of taxes are moved 
in opposite directions at the same time (one becomes more distortionary and the other less so). Here the 
coefficient on the level of taxes will be biased towards zero (its negative effects are being offset by the 
structure of taxation becoming less distortionary).7 In practice it seems likely that the direction of the bias 
will vary across countries and time periods. More generally this suggests a need to give some thought to 
both the level and the structure of taxation. 
 
If the tax level and tax structure have independent effects, changing one does not imply changes to the 
other, then they can be captured using different variables and the empirical solution would be to include 
measures of both in the regression equation. More likely the measures of taxation that are used by 
researchers capture aspects of both the level and the structure, making them interdependent. Once again 
issues relating to the budget constraint arise; if the level of taxation changes consideration has to be given 
to what other fiscal revenues, expenditures and the deficit have been included and excluded from the 
regression.  
 
Therefore, there also exists some motivation for including in the same regression average and marginal 
measures of the same tax. As discussed in Gemmell et al. (2009) top personal statutory rates capture the 
marginal rates relevant to higher income earners, they are likely to be close to the personal rates most 
relevant to many human capital accumulation and entrepreneurial decisions. Likewise, effective tax rates 
(ETRs), have been argued to reflect the tax rates relevant to corporate investment decisions under a 
variety of assumptions and, as Devereux et al. (2008) emphasize, the statutory corporate tax rate is the 
relevant rate applicable to corporate profit-shifting decisions. If done however, the research should 
recognize that the effects of changes in one measure of taxation, say the marginal tax rate, are conditional 
on the other included aspects, say the implicit average.  
                                                 
7 Dahlby and Ferede (2008) regress total tax revenues against the top rate of personal and corporate income tax and sales tax. 
Conditional on income levels they find the coefficients on the top rate of corporate and personal income taxes to be negatively 
associated with the total tax level. 
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A small number of studies have performed analyses of this type. Angelopoulos et al. (2007) use data from 
23 OECD countries from 1970 to 2000 (5-year averages) and have measures of implicit average, effective 
average and statutory tax rates. Unfortunately however they never include all measures within the 
regression equation, choosing instead to group them and include all effective average, implicit and 
statutory tax rates together in separate regressions. The budget deficit is excluded and thus forms the 
compensating fiscal item. For effective average income taxation they find a significant negative effect on 
growth that is robust in all bar two specifications, while for capital and consumption taxation they find no 
significant effects. Interestingly when using the top individual income tax rate, the top corporate income 
tax rate and the statutory manufacturing tax rate they find no significant effects at all. This would suggest 
that effective average and top marginal income tax rates have different growth outcomes. 
 
In contrast to the above Arnold (2008) and Gemmell et al. (2009) include multiple measures of the same 
tax in the same regression, but in slightly different ways. Arnold (2008) conditions the effects of taxation 
on the overall tax burden. He therefore considers the effect of a shift away from one type of tax to another, 
holding constant total tax revenues. Gemmell et al. (2009) alternatively control for the level of distortionary 
taxes and include the budget surplus/deficit and productive expenditures. Conditional on the level of taxes 
Arnold (2008) finds that an increase in the progressivity of income taxes decreases growth, even when 
conditioned on the share of personal income taxes. Gemmell et al. (2009) also uncover differences in the 
growth effects of average and marginal income taxes. The average distortionary tax variable, with non-
productive expenditure and non-distortionary taxes as the compensating fiscal items, has a negative 
correlation with growth, although this result is not robust to the inclusion of initial income. Conditional on 
this, the top statutory rates of income tax and corporate tax are also both negative.  
 
Changes to the mix of taxes are straight forward to deal with. Some studies include separate variables for 
different types of taxation. Arnold (2008) for example includes the share of revenue from each tax in total 
tax revenue which facilitates estimating changes in the mix of taxation.  
 
There are other studies that only include very broad revenue measures. Bania et al. (2007) use total state 
revenue which includes state and local taxes, fees and intergovernmental revenue as their only tax-related 
variable. Reed (2008) likewise uses a tax measure comprising all state and local tax revenue which may 
include transfers from the central government. We choose to exclude both studies from the final tables 
because their ‘tax’ variables might include a significant share of intergovernmental transfers.  
3.2 Measurement of Tax Shocks in Time Series Studies 
This sub-section reviews the measures of the tax burden in time series studies. Tax variables vary and 
include net tax measures (i.e. revenue minus transfers), total tax measures (i.e. total revenue) and 
disaggregate tax measures (i.e. revenue from a particular type of tax). Romer and Romer (2010) and 
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others for example, use tax liabilities to GDP which is probably close to the implicit average tax rate. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in contrast use a different measure, total tax revenues minus transfers. 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) also use a different measure: government receipts minus transfers and 
interest payments. Barro and Redlick (2009) is the only time series study that uses a measure of marginal 
tax rates. They use newly compiled time series on average marginal income tax rates for the U.S. 
spanning several decades up to 2006.  
 
Most of the measures used are quite broad, and the estimated output effects are difficult to interpret for 
policy. For instance, it is not possible to unambiguously identify the underlying policy change of an 
increase of net tax revenue measures (i.e. tax revenue minus spending items). Nevertheless, given that 
most studies use such measures, we include them in the final tables. It is also unclear to what extent the 
composition of tax shocks (i.e. the contribution of distortionary versus non-distortionary taxes to an 
increase in overall taxation for instance) matters over the short run. Among the few papers that consider 
shocks to different types of taxes are de Castro and de Cos (2008), Arin and Koray (2005) and Arin and 
Koray (2006). According to their estimates, the difference between shocks to revenue from different tax 
types appears to be small in some instances. Nevertheless, these issues limit the usefulness of these 
studies for forecasting the effects of tax reforms ex-ante.  
 
Another issue that is important for the dynamic response of output is the assumption about when the tax 
shock occurs. In principle, tax shocks can be anticipated or unanticipated so that the output effects at the 
date of the implementation or at the date of the announcement could be chosen. In addition, even after 
implementation, it is conceivable that the output response differs between anticipated and unanticipated 
tax shocks. However, few studies control for expectations. Using the dataset compiled by Romer and 
Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2009) for instance estimate the effects of anticipated and unanticipated 
tax shocks that are exogenous and not correlated to other developments in the economy. For each tax 
shock, they define the announcement and the implementation dates. If these dates are sufficiently close 
together, they classify the tax shock as ‘unanticipated’. They find that the dynamics of anticipated shocks 
resemble those of unanticipated tax shocks after implementation. However, they also show that there are 
significant pre-implementation effects when tax shocks are announced but not yet implemented, and these 
differ in sign and magnitude to the post-implementation output effects. In particular, they find that during 
the pre-implementation period an anticipated tax cut gives rise to significant declines in output contrary to 
the post-implementation period. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also find qualitatively similar results between 
anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks once tax changes are implemented. However, they find no 
output effects in the pre-implementation period. Part of the reason could be attributed to their identification 
strategy and their method of estimating pre-implementation effects, which differs from the one used in 
Mertens and Ravn (2009).8 
                                                 
8 Whether the tax shock underlying particular estimates is permanent or not may also be important for replication as suggested by 
Auerbach (2009). However, we do not discuss this issue further. 
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3.3 The Government Budget Constraint 
A key element when defining the empirical strategy to understand the output effects from tax changes is 
the recognition of the interdependence of fiscal variables across the government budget constraint: 
changes in one form of taxation must either be financed through changes in other taxes, changes to 
expenditures, or the budget deficit. There is an empirical counterpart to this: the estimated coefficient on a 
given fiscal variable, say income taxation, does not solely measure its direct effect on growth, but also 
includes information on the growth effects from the fiscal item(s) used to finance or offset it. Being able to 
identify the offsetting change is therefore in principle an important requirement for replication. 
Panel data studies 
For panel studies, Kneller et al. (1999) show that the correct interpretation of the coefficient on each fiscal 
category is the effect of a unit change in the relevant variable offset by a unit change in the omitted fiscal 
category.9 To understand the implications of this point, suppose that growth, git, in country i at time t is a 
function of conditioning (non-fiscal) variables, Yit , and a vector of fiscal variables, Xjt. 
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Since the budget constraint requires that expenditures are financed by the sum of taxes and the deficit, 
one element of X must be omitted in order to avoid perfect collinearity. The omitted variable is effectively 
the assumed compensating element within the government’s budget constraint. Thus, rewriting (1) as: 
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It follows that adjusting the omitted category changes the estimated coefficients of the included categories 
and (possibly but not necessarily) the resulting parameter estimate. Interpretation of the growth effects 
from a given fiscal change therefore requires consideration of what elements of the government budget 
are being excluded from the regression. In studies that directly apply the methodology to take into account 
the government budget constraint (GBC) outlined in Kneller et al. (1999) this is usually made clear. In 
those that do not formally use the GBC methodology it has to be inferred from what other forms of 
expenditure, taxation and the budget surplus/deficit have been included in the regression. Ideally then, 
                                                 
9 If distortionary taxes are the only element of the government budget that affects growth, as assumed in some early models of fiscal 
policy and growth, then this problem disappears and the parameter estimates directly capture those effects. 
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studies would properly specify the government budget constraint and then rotate a single omitted fiscal 
item such that all combinations of fiscal changes were identified. The sheer number of fiscal items that 
might be included in the regression means this is typically not done.10 Instead either broader aggregates, 
labelled as distortionary taxes for example, or elements from different parts of the GBC are omitted. 
 
The GBC generates greater problems for interpreting coefficient estimates when more than one type of 
fiscal variable is being excluded from the regression. In such a case we might think of the growth effect 
from a change in a given fiscal parameter as equal to its own direct effect on growth multiplied by the size 
of the change, minus the sum of the changes in each of the compensating fiscal components, multiplied 
by the effect that each of those has on growth. This implies that interpretation becomes difficult because 
we do not directly observe those changes made to the other fiscal categories or the direct growth effects 
associated with those fiscal variables. While the particular parameter estimate provides information of the 
growth effect compensated by a given set of changes elsewhere in the GBC, we therefore cannot be sure 
what the complete policy change was. Therefore, it may not be feasible to replicate the exact policy 
change so that the estimates cannot be used to forecast the output effects that result from tax reforms. 
 
To take a specific example: suppose that a measure of income taxation were included within the 
regression and the omitted fiscal items, the compensating aspects of fiscal policy, were capital taxation, 
productive government expenditures and the budget deficit. We could only be sure we correctly forecast 
the growth effect from a given change in income taxation using that parameter if we could exactly identify 
the changes that also occurred to capital taxation, productive expenditures and the deficit and knew the 
direct effects each of those had on growth. Even if we knew the average set of compensating changes 
typically associated with a change in income taxation, we do not know the direct growth effect of each of 
the omitted fiscal elements. From this we derive the rule of thumb: the fewer the fiscal variables included 
in the regression, the longer is the list its estimated effect on growth is conditional on, the more difficult it is 
to identify and to replicate the tax reform underlying the estimates in practice, and therefore the less useful 
it is for policy advice. Below, we review how and to what extent panel and time series have incorporated 
the GBC. 
 
For panel studies, economic theory allows making an exception to the inclusion of a large number of fiscal 
variables which is useful when including many fiscal variables is not feasible or desirable. Following the 
Barro (1990) model we might classify some expenditure types as unproductive and some taxes as non-
distortionary. In such cases the growth effects from those particular fiscal items are zero (or in practice at 
least very small), so if omitted together, it does not matter what the extent of the change across those two 
groups were, as neither has an effect on growth. This is the approach taken in Kneller et al. (1999), 
Bleaney et al. (2001), Benos (2009), and Gemmell et al. (2009). They use economic theory to suggest the 
                                                 
10 As most of the categories are near zero, this often leads to problems of multicollinearity, so that most variables tend to be poorly 
identified. 
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categories that are predicted to have zero effects on growth and therefore aid with the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients. As an additional exception, we also assume that papers which exclude non-tax 
revenue and other taxes alongside other fiscal variables adequately consider the government budget 
constraint and therefore include their estimates in the final tables. The reasons include that the magnitude 
of these items is often relatively small compared to revenue from broad-based taxes in many OECD 
countries, non-tax revenue is to some extent exogenously given so that it may not be used to offset tax 
changes, and the growth effects that changes of this type of revenue entail may also be small. 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) find that the coefficient on distortionary taxation (taxation of income and profit, social 
security contributions, taxation on payroll and manpower, taxation on property), financed by either 
changes to unproductive expenditures, non-distortionary taxation (taxation of domestic goods and 
services) or both, yields a robust negative effect on growth. These effects are conditional on the inclusion 
of other revenues, which include taxes on international trade, other tax revenues and non-tax revenues. 
The same approach is taken in Benos (2009) who assumes that non-distortionary taxes and other 
revenues are the compensating fiscal items that are used to offset changes, amongst other things, in a 
measure of distortionary taxation (calculated as the sum of tax revenues on income and wealth, capital 
and social security contributions). There is some sensitivity to the exact parameter estimate according to 
the methodology used; he attempts to control for endogeneity problems, but in general finds a significant 
negative growth effect from distortionary taxes. 
 
One study that does not formally introduce the government budget constraint, but that includes a sufficient 
number of fiscal categories for us to imply its use is Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008). Romero-Ávila and 
Strauch (2008) include in their regressions measures of consumption spending, total transfers, public 
investment and rotate the tax variables. They exclude the budget deficit/surplus. They therefore consider 
the effect of a change in different taxes financed by changes to the budget deficit.11  
 
Arin (2004) further disaggregates taxation into income taxes, corporate taxes, indirect taxes and social 
security taxes, changing across the regressions exactly which tax variable is being included (which is the 
reason why we include the paper in the tables). The paper does not detail either whether the budget 
constraint has been fully specified. However, the specifications also include government outlays 
(government purchases, subsidies, transfers and wages) and capital outlays (government fixed capital 
value formation) as control variables. Broadly we might therefore interpret the coefficients on the tax 
variables as capturing the effect of the included tax categories financed by a change in the budget 
surplus/deficit and the omitted tax. While there are two items omitted with potentially non-zero growth 
effects, we still include the paper because it disaggregates taxation so that the omitted tax element is at 
least well identified.  
                                                 
11 A failure to recognize the implications of excluding the budget surplus/deficit probably accounts for the sense of disappointment 
the authors have with their tax results. 
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Conditional on the overall tax burden Arnold (2008) includes measures of income taxes (in total and 
separated into personal and corporate income taxes) and consumption and property taxes. The results 
therefore show that a shift in the tax burden away from consumption and property taxes and towards 
income taxes is associated with lower growth, with somewhat stronger effects from corporate income 
taxes. A shift towards property and consumption taxes and away from income taxation has the opposite 
effect; it is associated with higher growth. Indeed fairly uniquely within the literature he investigates the 
effect of dropping different tax variables one at a time, thereby allowing comparisons of different 
compensating changes from the same tax policy change. 
 
Bania et al. (2007) employ a dataset on subnational fiscal policy and explicitly consider the government 
budget constraint by specifying that the only offsetting (omitted) fiscal variable is productive expenditure. 
Reed (2008) reports one specification where the omitted fiscal variables include productive public 
spending and the deficit. They argue that at the level of the U.S. states, deficits are usually negligibly small 
compared to overall revenues and expenditures. Given that this may have held prior to the recent 
economic crisis, we do not exclude Reed (2008) on the basis that they do not consider the GBC. 
However, as argued above, we exclude both studies because the tax measures they include are fairly 
broad. Whether Angelopoulos et al. (2007) incorporate the GBC is debatable: they include various tax 
variables and the ratio of productive spending over total government expenditure. This set-up is not ideal 
because an increase in taxation may be offset by a decrease in the deficit, the level of total public 
spending or other revenue. However, given that an increase of total spending with unchanged allocation 
between productive and unproductive spending seems unlikely, and given that we ignore other revenue 
for the reason explained above, the offsetting change is most likely the deficit. We therefore include their 
estimates in the final tables.  
 
Of those papers that are based on subnational data, Alm and Rogers (forthcoming) employ the richest 
fiscal data in the sense that they consider most tax variables including total taxes, corporate taxes, income 
taxes, sales taxes and property taxes in the same specifications. However, given that the focus of their 
paper is on whether fiscal policy affects growth at all and on the direction of the growth effects rather on 
their exact magnitude, the offsetting change is not clear despite the large number of tax variables. The 
reason is that whether the tax variables are measured in terms of state GDP or total tax revenue is not 
made explicit for each set of results. This is problematic as the measurement of the tax variables implicitly 
determines the offsetting change, for instance, whether it is public spending or another type of tax. We 
therefore exclude this study from the summary tables.12  
 
                                                 
12 In addition, the authors admit that the coefficients are not robust which may be attributed to the fact that the offsetting change 
differs across specifications.  
14 
 
In contrast, Denaux (2005) only includes one tax variable and the share of public infrastructure investment 
in total spending in their regressions which is arguably a narrower fiscal aggregate compared to 
productive expenditure. We therefore exclude Denaux (2005) from our final tables. The results by Denaux 
et al. (2005) are likewise difficult to interpret because they only include proxies of infrastructure public 
spending (a measure of road density) and education expenditure per student (and not as a ratio to total 
spending or GDP) as control variables. The number of fiscal variables included in the specifications of 
Wildmalm (2001), Castro (2006), Colombier (2009), Doménech and García (2001) and Padovano and 
Galli (2002) is not sufficient to identify the offsetting change. We therefore exclude their estimates in the 
summary tables.  
Time Series Studies 
There has been only little discussion about the role of the government budget constraint in the time series 
literature, and, as a result, there are often several elements of fiscal policy that implicitly offset changes in 
taxation. From our discussion above, we can therefore not be sure what the exact policy change was and 
that the exact fiscal policy change can be replicated. This applies even to some of the more prominent 
papers including Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Dungey and Fry (2008), Mertens and Ravn (2009) and 
Perotti (2004).  
 
While there are no time series studies that clearly identify the public spending category that offsets tax 
shocks, there are nevertheless a few papers that recognize the GBC and that suggest that the offsetting 
change, at least in broad terms, matters. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) is one example: they recognize that 
the government budget constraint gives rise to a large set of different tax shocks even if one ignores the 
possibility that it is possible to consider shocks to different tax measures and tax types which would 
increase their number further. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) first estimate the impulse response function to 
two ‘basic’ fiscal shocks including a shock to net taxes and a shock to general spending. They then 
consider different combinations of these ‘basic’ fiscal shocks which allows to specify what the offsetting 
change is. On the one hand, they consider the output effects of a deficit-financed tax cut where public 
spending remains unchanged for four quarters following the shock. On the other hand, they consider an 
increase in taxation that is matched by an increase in public spending. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) find 
that while both tax shocks imply a fall of output, a deficit-financed tax increase is less harmful for output 
according to their estimates. 
 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) take a similar approach. Their results suggest that differences between the 
specifications where tax changes are explicitly offset by the deficit and those where the offsetting change 
is not considered are small. However and in contrast to Mountford and Uhlig (2008), they find that the 
effects of tax shocks offset by the deficit and offset by spending may have opposing signs.  
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Romer and Romer (2010) also consider tax shocks where the offsetting change is the deficit. Their 
approach is different in the sense that their dataset allows differentiating between deficit-financed tax 
changes and tax changes that were implemented for other reasons. However, the discussions in Romer 
and Romer (2010) imply that there may be some ‘contamination’ in the sense that deficit reductions in the 
past were often accompanied by public spending cuts which they do not control for. Nevertheless, the 
results by Romer and Romer (2010) suggest that the effects of tax changes offset by the deficit and those 
offset by a combination of public spending and the deficit differ in terms of the sign.  
 
In other papers, the offsetting change is less explicit, but it can still be imperfectly identified because they 
also estimate the response of government expenditure to changes in taxation. When the change of 
expenditure is close to zero as in Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Claus et al. (2006), the government 
budget constraint implies that changes in taxation are offset by the deficit. In these cases, the reason why 
this is the case may be related to the fact that these shocks are temporary (and hence by definition do not 
persist so that public spending patterns are not adjusted).  
 
Given that only few papers unambiguously identify the offsetting change, we are unable to exclude studies 
based on this criterion because this would leave us with too few estimates. However, whether or under 
what conditions the offsetting change matters for the output effects of tax changes over the short run is not 
fully clear. For instance, under certain conditions, the short-run output effects of different public spending 
categories may be similar. It could be argued that the supply-side effects differ to a greater extent than the 
demand-side effects. While the latter materialize instantly, the former do not, for instance due to time-to-
build requirements of infrastructure for example. This would imply that the short-run output effects are 
driven by the demand-side effects and may therefore be similar. For instance, spending on salaries of 
teachers and salaries of other civil servants could be expected to have the same demand-side effects, but 
the former can be expected to contribute more likely to human capital accumulation and long-run growth. 
Nevertheless, not being able to identify the offsetting change means that the estimates are generally less 
useful for policy. 
4 Reliability 
Panel Studies 
As a last step to evaluate the usefulness of the panel studies, we assess whether their estimates are 
reliable. Generally speaking however, we regard studies that recognize the GBC as reliable. We therefore 
do not limit the number of studies further based on lacking reliability, but we only consider significant 
estimates. 
 
Panel studies frequently suffer from unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error. While recognizing 
that the GBC eliminates one source of unobserved heterogeneity, it may be questionable if tax and 
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expenditure measures are comparable across countries. These problems frequently apply to studies 
based on cross-country data so that one solution is to use subnational data where the extent of 
unobserved heterogeneity is arguably smaller. However, Dahlby and Ferede (2008) is the only paper that 
we are able to include in the summary tables.  
 
Identification is another issue that is important to assess the reliability of the estimates. A branch of the 
literature has begun to examine what happens to the domestic growth rates as a result of changes in 
foreign country tax rates. While interesting, as foreign taxes lie outside of the policy influence of most 
countries, we do not discuss this point in detail. Their inclusion or exclusion, outside of any omitted 
variable bias, should not affect the interpretation of any other the other domestic fiscal variables. 
Interestingly the evidence from Gemmell et al. (2009) suggests a strong omitted variable bias. Including 
foreign corporation tax measures causes the coefficient on the top rate of domestic corporate income 
taxation to switch from positive to negative. This is perhaps caused by the general downward trend that 
has occurred across all OECD countries over this time period. 
 
Endogeneity potentially creates another problem. The fact that faster growth induces changes in total 
government expenditure or taxation is well known. Distortionary taxes such as capital and personal 
income taxes would be expected to be income-elastic and therefore pro-cyclical (both absolutely and 
relative to non-distortionary taxes). As a result they would be expected to rise, as a share of GDP, when 
income grows more rapidly and fall (or rise more slowly) when income grows slowly. Endogeneity 
arguments may therefore lower (downward bias) the estimated relationship between taxes and growth. 
There may be additional effects through the budget constraint: expenditures and budget surpluses are 
also known to vary over the business cycle.  
 
The standard econometric response to this problem is to find some instruments for the endogenous 
variable. Unfortunately good instruments are difficult to find and so researchers more commonly used 
lagged values of the fiscal variables. Using such an approach Gemmell et al. (2009, 2011) find that the 
corrected coefficients on taxation do not differ strongly from those estimated without instrumenting. As well 
as instrumenting using lagged values, Arnold (2008) also tries removing the correlation with the business 
cycle by regressing his measures on the output gap. Unfortunately the regressions are somewhat 
modified compared to those that do not use an instrumental variable approach so that it is not possible to 
comment exactly on the size of any bias. However the total tax variable, which should be robust to these 
other changes in specification, has a very similarly sized effect. The idea that endogeneity has only a 
small effect on the parameter estimates contrasts with the evidence presented in Benos (2009). Here, 
again using lagged values, the coefficient on distortionary taxation is between 7 and 19 times larger 
depending on the exact specification chosen. Alternatively, studies have used 5-year averages to 
minimize problems related to unobserved endogeneity. 
17 
 
Time Series Studies 
In the summary tables, we include most time series studies, but omit all specifications which result in 
insignificant estimates (i.e. when the error band includes zero). However, the studies seem to differ in 
terms of the reliability of their estimates with more recent studies appearing to provide more robust 
estimates.  
 
One central issue that affects the reliability of the time series estimates is the identification strategy of tax 
shocks. There are different ones used in the literature. The sign-restriction approach identifies fiscal 
shocks via sign restrictions on the impulse responses. The identification approach by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) relies on institutional information about the tax and transfer systems and about the timing of 
tax collections in order to identify the automatic response of taxes and government spending to economic 
activity. The recursive approach implies a causal ordering of the model variables (Caldara and Kamps, 
2008). The empirical results are often not robust to the choice of the identification strategy which is 
demonstrated by Caldara and Kamps (2008). They estimate impulse response functions to tax shocks 
using quarterly data of the U.S. from 1955 to 2006 and find that the choice of the identifying assumption 
matters.  
 
Romer and Romer (2010) adopt a narrative approach, but use a single equation framework. They argue 
that tax changes occur for a number of reasons, some of which are correlated with other developments in 
the economy, which gives rise to an omitted variable bias. They use narrative sources such as presidential 
speeches or reports prepared by the government or the Congress to identify exogenous tax changes. 
These tax changes were implemented for exogenous reasons, which include the reduction of an inherited 
budget deficit or the promotion of long-run growth, and not in response to changes in output or to offset 
changes in spending. Using narrative information to identify tax changes has a number of advantages. 
Romer and Romer (2010) argue that this may be the only way to successfully deal with the omitted 
variable bias as many tax changes are correlated with other macro variables. Mertens and Ravn (2009) 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2010) further argue that a structural VAR framework is unattractive to study the 
impact of anticipated tax shocks.  
 
Most time series studies may suffer from unobserved heterogeneity because the offsetting change is often 
unclear and the tax change itself is often only vaguely specified and may entail changes in the tax mix and 
the tax structure. However, it is equally possible that alternative offsetting changes and tax mix and tax 
structure changes have similar effects over the short-run implying that this is not a source of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
18 
 
5 Estimated Output Responses to Tax Reforms 
Panel Studies 
In Tables 2 to 5 we summarize the long-run and significant coefficient estimates with respect to the growth 
effects of personal income taxes, corporate taxes, distortionary taxes in general and consumption as well 
as property taxes, respectively.13 These tables only summarize those estimates that we regard as useful 
for policy based on the criteria discussed in the previous sections. In most cases, there are a several 
offsetting changes considered which are specified in the tables and labeled as ‘omitted variables’. On a 
number of occasions where the same compensating changes are being considered, different measures of 
the same tax are employed. Most papers include similar control variables in each specification which are 
summarized in the tables as well and which can be categorized as follows: initial GDP, measures of 
human capital, physical capital, or labor force growth.  
 
Before discussing these estimates, we note an issue about the comparability of the coefficients. Most of 
the studies do not take logs of the fiscal variables (this is not possible if the budget deficit/surplus is being 
used). As such the estimated coefficients imply that the marginal effect on growth (or the log difference in 
GDP) is constant at all values of the fiscal variable (as opposed to the elasticity being constant in a double 
log model). This makes it difficult to directly compare the estimated coefficients where different measures 
of the same tax variable are used, for example comparing implicit average and top statutory rates, as they 
will depend on the unit of measurement. Unfortunately most of the studies do not report summary 
statistics and so it is also difficult to calculate elasticity values from the data (we would normally do this at 
one specific value of the right-hand side variables, most commonly the mean). Where they use the same 
type of measure, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are broadly comparable. In some cases, 
comparisons are however further complicated because the studies use different dependent variables 
including per capita growth, absolute growth and per capita GDP levels. 
 
The estimates with respect to personal income taxation are reported in Table 2. For personal taxation, 
several measures of the tax burden are considered including effective rates, implicit average rates, top 
statutory rates and the shares of personal income tax revenue in total revenue. The estimated coefficients 
appear to be consistently negative. One interesting comparison is that between Arin (2004) and Dahlby 
and Ferede (2008). Both consider the effect of an increase in personal income taxation financed by a 
reduction in the budget deficit and other tax revenues. Arin (2004) finds the estimated coefficient of -0.2 
using an implicit average measure and Dahlby and Ferede (2008) -0.05 to -0.065 using a top statutory tax 
rate. The coefficients partly reflect differences in the units of measurement. As the papers both report 
summary statistics we use these to estimate elasticities (calculated at the mean values). The elasticities 
on income taxation in the two studies are very similar at around -0.67 from Dahlby and Ferede (2008) and 
                                                 
13 One paper that we mainly exclude because the coefficients are not significant includes Aiginger and Falk (2005) who include total 
taxation and social security contributions in their specification.  
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-0.8 from Arin (2004).14 The estimates provided by Gemmell et al. (2009) allow us to compare how the 
growth effects of the implicit average measures differ when top statutory taxes are included. When 
excluding both non-distortionary taxes and non-productive expenditures the coefficient on distortionary 
taxation is significant and negative and those on the top statutory rate of personal income taxation are in 
the range of -0.02 to -0.04 and therefore smaller. The remaining estimates on personal income taxation 
are taken from Arnold (2008). These capture the effect of a change in the tax mix, financed by reductions 
in other types of taxes holding total revenues constant, and they use the log of GDP per capita as 
dependent variable. In addition, given that the unit of measurement of the tax burden is different, direct 
comparisons of the results are difficult; his coefficient estimates are in the range of -0.2 to  
-1.4.  
 
For corporate taxation, the coefficients which are summarized in Table 3 are also generally negative. The 
exception to this occurs in the study by Angelopoulos et al. (2007) where using a measure of the top 
marginal tax rate and essentially holding public spending constant as argued above (i.e. this cannot be the 
compensating fiscal term) results in a coefficient of 0.05. This contrasts with the estimates of Dahlby and 
Ferede (2008) which differ in using the top statutory rate and in including total expenditures and the top 
rate of personal income taxation. They find that the effect of corporate taxation is negative and between  
-0.11 and -0.16. In turn these estimates are similar to those in Gemmell et al. (2009), also using the top 
statutory rate and including productive expenditures and the deficit (estimates are in the range of -0.04 to  
-0.13).   
 
As a final exercise, in order to compare these estimates to the estimated elasticity for income taxation, we 
calculate the elasticity between corporate taxation and growth implied by the Dahlby and Ferede (2008) 
study. The elasticity is greater than that for personal income taxation, between -0.91 and -1.26 per cent 
depending on the exact parameter chosen (for the mean value of corporate income taxes). This general 
conclusion, that the growth effects of corporate taxes are stronger than those for income taxes, is 
supported by the evidence presented in Gemmell et al. (2009) and Arnold (2008).  
 
Table 4 summarizes the estimates with respect to distortionary taxation in general. Inevitably, the range of 
tax measures used is narrower because several tax types are summed together and include the implicit 
average tax rate and tax shares. Close consideration of Table 4 suggests that for distortionary taxation the 
most common compensating changes chosen are non-productive expenditures, non-distortionary taxation 
or both. Here the effect of an increase in taxation on growth is around -0.4 in most cases when the 
dependent variable is some measure of growth. The stability of the coefficient across several 
specifications is perhaps explained by the choice of compensating fiscal items, both of which are predicted 
to have zero growth effects. There are some exceptions to this. In Gemmell et al. (2009) the coefficient on 
distortionary taxation is smaller at around -0.21. These regressions include measures of the top statutory 
                                                 
14 Arin (2004) does not present standard deviations so that we cannot take this comparison further. 
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rate of the income tax, suggesting that the implicit average tax measures used elsewhere probably 
capture in part the effects of changes to this variable. The estimates from Benos (2009) are outliers 
compared to these other studies. There the coefficients of distortionary taxation are between -0.08 and  
-1.52. The estimated coefficient of -0.08 comes from an estimate by OLS (-0.10 using fixed effects), and 
the higher figures refer to GMM (instrumental variable) estimates. Under one of the GMM estimates listed 
the coefficient estimate on distortionary taxation is -0.54. We therefore consider the plausible range for the 
coefficient estimate to be up to -0.54. The estimated coefficient on distortionary taxes in Arnold (2008) is  
-0.98, about twice the effect from above, but in this case the variables are expressed as a ratio to total 
revenue rather than GDP, and GDP per capita in levels is the dependent variable. Here the coefficient 
reflects a change in the tax mix towards income taxation, by decreasing all non-distortionary taxes and 
holding total revenue constant. The paper does not report summary statistics which would allow 
calculating elasticities to ease comparisons with the results above. Finally, Romero-Ávilla and Strauch 
(2008) consider a change in direct taxation compensated by a change in the budget surplus/deficit (and 
other tax revenues). Here the effect of an increase in taxation on growth would seem poorly identified (it 
differs between -0.04 and 0.05). The regressions from which these come are some attempts to control for 
endogeneity problems. The most standard approach, a GMM estimator, yields a coefficient that is not 
statistically significantly different from zero at -0.01 which nevertheless suggests that the GMM 
methodology generates results that can be very different from other panel approaches. In addition, 
Romero-Ávilla and Strauch (2008) include relatively few control variables which might be another reason 
about why their results diverge from the remaining papers. 
 
The paper by Arnold (2008) is of further interest because it rotates the implicit financing variable such that 
we can consider the effects of changes in property or consumption taxation, conditional on reductions in 
personal or corporate income taxation. The coefficients which are summarized in Table 5 suggest that 
increasing the share of these types of taxes benefits growth, and that the output effects from changes in 
property taxation are larger than those for consumption taxes.   
Time Series Studies 
In Tables 6 to 9 we summarize the estimated short-term output response to positive tax shocks (i.e. tax 
increases) in terms of tax multipliers for time studies that are significant.15 We make the estimates 
comparable as follows. We calculate tax multipliers as the ratio of the estimated output change to the 
change in tax revenue if not reported in the papers. For papers that report the output response to a tax 
cut, we change the sign of the estimate. In the tables, we report the peak response (which we 
approximate from the graphs that show the impulse response functions if not reported in the paper) and in 
the ‘time horizon’ column the number of quarters when the peak is reached. While we recognize that 
differences in peak estimates may conceal similarities in the overall evolution of the output response, the 
                                                 
15 See de Castro and de Cos (2008) and Claus et al. (2006) for additional tables that summarize the estimated output responses to 
tax shocks.  
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advantage of approximations of peak estimates is that they can be extracted from every paper that 
includes an impulse response. There are only two papers that only present point estimates including 
Perotti (2011) and Barro and Redlick (2009). However, their estimated tax multipliers are mostly within the 
range of estimated peak responses.  
 
We subdivide the studies by the type of tax variable they consider. Table 6 summarizes the estimated 
effects of an increase of revenue from net taxation, Table 7 summarizes the estimated effects of an 
increase of revenue from total taxation, Table 8 summarizes the estimated effects of an increase of 
revenue from some specific tax type. While Barro and Redlick (2009) partly estimate the effects of 
changes of the average marginal tax rate on GDP growth, they calculate from these estimates the tax 
multiplier with respect to total tax revenue.  
 
In general, the estimated output response of positive shocks to total and net revenue is negative which 
mostly holds irrespective of whether the offsetting change is considered or not. There are exceptions to 
this, which can however be reconciled with the remaining estimates to some extent. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2010) find positive output effects for tax shocks during recessions. However, they 
suggest that this result is not robust to the choice of the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to output that 
is required for the Blanchard-Perotti identification. Caldara and Kamps (2008) find positive effects of tax 
shocks that finance spending increases for the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identification approaches, 
which squares with the fact that find no output effects for deficit-financed tax cuts for the same 
identification strategies. These results contrast however with those based on the sign restriction approach. 
Claus et al. (2006) finds partially positive effects, but this result is not robust to the trend specification. In 
addition, the overall evolution of the impulse response still shares some similarities with the other 
specifications in the same paper where the output effects are negative. 
 
Perroti (2005) likewise finds positive effects for several countries which cannot be explained easily. 
Giordano et al. (2007) find positive and statistically significant effects for Italy. Likewise, Marcellino (2002) 
who, like Giordano et al. (2007), uses Italian data also finds positive effects which are difficult to reconcile 
with the remaining studies. He suggests that this may be a consequence of the improvement in the 
government deficit as the spending response to the tax shock is close to zero.  
 
A final exception is one specification in Romer and Romer (2010) which takes the deficit as the offsetting 
change and which also results in positive output effects. However, their results contrast with the ones by 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Mountford and Uhlig (2008) find partly negative output effects resulting 
from a deficit-reducing increase in net taxation.  
 
In contrast, the magnitude of the estimates diverges, and it is difficult to make general statements. For 
instance, whether the shocks are anticipated or not does not seem to affect the magnitudes of the peak 
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tax multiplier in a specific way. We only discuss the differences in terms of the magnitudes of the effects 
for the narrative identification of the tax shocks because this identification strategy is increasingly seen as 
the most appropriate one. Romer and Romer (2010) find tax multipliers of up to -3. Favero and Giavazzi 
(2010) argue that tax multipliers should ideally be estimated based on the narrative identification 
introduced by Romer and Romer (2010) but within a multivariate dynamic model contrary to the approach 
taken by Romer and Romer (2010). As a result, they find much smaller multipliers of about -1.  In contrast, 
Perotti (2011) argues that the output effects of discretionary tax changes and endogenous response of 
taxes are likely to differ. He then shows that once this holds true, there is a downward bias of the 
specification by Favero and Giavazzi (2010). He therefore proposes an instrumental variable estimation as 
a remedy which results in tax multipliers of around 1.5 which are in between the ones estimated by Favero 
and Giavazzi (2010) and Perotti (2011).  
 
Table 8 shows that the estimated output effects resulting from changes of different tax types likewise 
diverge and sometimes contradict the predictions of economic theory. While for some specifications, large 
parts of the impulse response functions are not significant in Arin and Koray (2005) and Arin and Koray 
(2006) (apart from the peak estimate), de Castro and Hernandéz de Cos (2008) also find that the peak 
output response to an increase in social security contributions is positive.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper has evaluated the usefulness of empirical studies to predict the effects of tax changes on 
output in OECD countries. We have selected only those studies that are based on recent OECD data and 
have distinguished two branches of the literature: panel studies mostly estimate the long-run impact, 
whereas time series studies estimate the short-run response of output to changes in taxation. We have 
discussed two issues in detail. First, we have evaluated if the tax changes whose effects are estimated 
are replicable based on whether and to what extent they take into account the government budget 
constraint and based on the tax measures they use. Second, we have discussed the reliability of the 
results. 
 
For the panel studies, we showed that difficulties to replicate the tax changes and to interpret the results 
implied that some studies are not suitable for policy advice. In contrast, lacking reliability appeared not to 
be a major problem for the remaining studies. While we have most confidence in Gemmell et al. (2009) 
and Arnold (2008), this does not mean that we discard the remaining studies that consider the government 
budget constraint. Generally, the growth effects of tax changes depend on the tax type and the offsetting 
change considered. 
 
For the time series studies, it may be difficult to replicate the estimates in practice. However, we have not 
applied this criterion rigorously to time series studies because this would imply excluding most results, and 
because it is not clear to what extent this criterion matters over the short run: in general, there seems to 
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be increasingly the consensus that the output effects are negative possibly suggesting that various 
different tax reforms have similar affects. Nevertheless, predicting the short-run effects using these 
estimates for policy purposes is therefore associated with a greater uncertainty. Reliability depends on the 
identification strategy, and there seems to be a consensus emerging that identification based on narrative 
evidence of the type introduced by Romer and Romer (2010) is the most appropriate strategy. With 
respect to the measure of the tax variables, the use of marginal tax rates in time series studies as in the 
case of Barro and Redlick (2009) seems to be a promising route for future research.  
 
Considering the time series and panel literature together implies that depending on the tax change, short- 
and long-run effects may have opposing signs. Long-run estimates are largely in line with theory and 
mostly refer to changes in distortionary taxation offset by unproductive spending or non-distortionary 
taxation. These tax changes generally entail negative growth effects similarly to negative tax multipliers 
usually found by the time series studies. In contrast, the long-run growth effects of increases of non-
distortionary taxation offset by decreases in distortionary taxation may be positive. While the time series 
studies do not specifically estimate the effects of this particular tax shock, the fact that output multipliers 
are negative irrespective of the offsetting change and whether or not the role of the government budget 
constraint is considered suggests that the short-run output response of tax changes with positive long-run 
effects may well be negative. However, future research will ideally address the possibility of trade-offs 
between the short and long run in greater detail.  
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8 Appendix 
Table 1: Overview of panel studies that are evaluated 
Type Paper Data 
Cross-country panel 
Aiginger and Falk (2005) OECD, 1970 – 1999  
Angelopoulos et al. (2007) 23 OECD, 1970 – 2000 
Arin (2004) G7, 1965 – 2000  
Arin et al. (2008) UK, US, Scandinavia, years differ 
Arnold (2008) 21 OECD, 1971 – 2004 
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2007) EU-15, 1971 – 2001 
Benos (2009 14 EU, 1990 – 2006 
Bleaney et al. (2001) OECD, 1970 – 1995 
Castro (2006) EU-15 (except Lux), 1970 – 2000  
Colombier (2009) 21 OECD, 1970 – 2001 
Doménech and García (2001) OECD, 1960 – 1995  
Gemmell et al. (2009) 17 OECD, late 1970s - 2004  
Kneller et al. (1999) 22 OECD, 1970 – 1995  
Padovano and Galli (2002) 25 developed countries, 1970 – 1998  
Widmalm (2001) 23 OECD, 1965 – 1990 
Subnational panel 
Alm and Rogers (forthcoming) 
Bania et al. (2007) 
48 U.S. states, 1947 – 1997 
49 U.S. states, 1962 – 1997 
Dahlby and Ferede (2008) Canadian provinces, 1977 – 2006 
Denaux (2005) North Carolina counties, 1980 – 1995  
Denaux et al. (2005) 48 U.S. states, 1969 – 1988 
Reed, R. (2008) 48 U.S. states, 1970 – 1999 
Time series 
Arin and Koray (2005) Several OECD, around 1960 – 2001 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) U.S., 1947 – 2009 
Barro and Redlick (2009) U.S., 1950 – 2006 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) U.S., 1960 – 1997 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2006 
Claus et al. (2006) New Zealand, 1982 – 2004 
de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) Spain, 1980 – 2004 
Dungey and Fry (2008) New Zealand, 1983 – 2006 
Favero and Giavazzi (2010) U.S., 1950 – 2007, quarterly  
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy, 1982 – 2004 
Marcellino (2002) Italy, 1981 – 2001 
Mertens and Ravn (2009) U.S., 1947 – 2006 
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2000 
Perotti (2004) 
Perotti (2011) 
Several OECD, 1960 – 2001 
U.S., 1945 – 2009, quarterly 
Romer and Romer (2010) U.S., 1947 – 2007 
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Table 2: Overview of estimated growth effects of personal income taxation (Part 1) 
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Tax measure effective IATR top statutory top statutory top statutory 
Endogenous Variable 
growth p.c. p.c. growth growth growth  
(in %) (in %) growth (in %) (in %) 
Coefficient  
Low -0.174 
-0.199 
-0.065 -0.033 -0.039 
High -0.118 -0.054 -0.018 -0.034 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.    I     
tax revenue          
deficit O O O I I 
productive expenditure I     I I 
non-productive exp. I     O O 
other expenditure          
government cons.  I       
government invest.  I       
transfers           
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct        I 
non-dist. / indirect  I   O O 
other revenue / tax O O O    
personal I I  I  I I 
corporate I I I I I 
consumption I        
property           
'tax structure' included (I) as separate variables 
progressivity of inc. tax         
Included (I) 'control' variables 
initial GDP I   I     
human capital I I  I I 
other macro variables I   I     
physical capital I I I I I 
labor force growth I   I I I 
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Table 2 – continued – (Part 2)  
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Tax measure % total tax % total tax % total tax % total tax % total tax 
Endogenous Variable p.c. GDP  (in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
Coefficient  
Low 
-1.13 -0.2 1.01 -0.96 -1.35 
High 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.           
tax revenue I I I I I 
deficit           
productive expenditure           
non-productive exp.           
other expenditure           
government cons.           
government invest.           
transfers           
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct          
non-dist. / indirect O        
other revenue / tax   O       
personal  I  I I I I 
corporate I  O I I 
consumption    I O I 
property     I I O 
'tax structure' included (I) as separate variables 
progressivity of inc. tax   I       
Included (I) / 'control' variables 
initial GDP           
human capital I I I I I 
other macro variables           
physical capital I I I I I 
labor force growth I I I I I 
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Table 3: Overview of estimated growth effects of corporate taxation 
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Tax measures top statutory 
top 
statutory statutory statutory effective % total tax % total tax % total tax % total tax 
Endogenous variable 
growth p.c. growth growth growth growth p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) 
Coefficient  low 0.047 
-0.158 -0.13 
-0.13 
-0.161 
-2.01 -1.18 -2.04 -2.4 
high -0.108 -0.035 -0.049 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.   I               
tax revenue         I I I I 
deficit O O I I I       
productive expenditure I  I I I       
non-productive exp.     O O O        
other expenditure               
government cons.               
government invest.               
transfers                   
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct      I         
non-dist. / indirect     O O O O      
other revenue / tax O O            
personal  I I I I I I O I I 
corporate I  I I I I I I I I 
consumption           I O I 
property             I I O 
Included (I) 'control' variables 
initial GDP I I               
human capital I  I I I I I I I 
other macro variables I I            
physical capital I I I I I I I I I 
labor force growth I I I I I I I I I 
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Table 4: Overview of estimated growth effects of distortionary taxation (Part 1) 
Study 
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Tax measures IATR IATR IATR IATR IATR IATR 
Endogenous variable p.c. growth (in %) 
p.c. growth 
(in %) 
growth p.c. growth 
(in %) 
p.c. growth  
(in %) 
p.c. growth 
(in %) (in %) 
Coefficient  low 
-0.04 -1.516 
-0.208 -0.467 
-0.854 -0.427 
high 0.05 -0.077 -0.411 -0.393 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.          
tax revenue          
deficit O I I I I I 
productive expenditure  I I I I I 
non-productive exp.  I O O O I 
other expenditure  O  I I I 
government cons. I         
government investment I         
transfers I           
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct I I I I I I 
non-dist. / indirect I O O I O O 
other revenue / tax     I I I 
personal     I      
corporate    I      
consumption          
property             
Included (I) 'control' variables 
initial GDP             
human capital I I I      
other macro variables  I  I I I 
physical capital  I I I I I 
labor force growth   I I I I I 
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Table 4 – continued – (Part 2) 
Study 
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Tax measures IATR IATR IATR % total tax 
Endogenous variable p.c. growth  
(in %) 
p.c. growth  
(in %) 
p.c. growth  
(in %) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
Coefficient  
low -0.467 -0.463 -0.446 -0.98 
high -0.41 -0.41 -0.427 -0.28 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.        
tax revenue      I 
deficit I I I   
productive expenditure I I I   
non-productive exp. O O I   
other expenditure I I I   
government cons.        
government investment        
transfers         
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct I I I I 
non-dist. / indirect I O O O 
other revenue / tax I I I   
personal        
corporate       
consumption       
property         
Included (I) 'control' variables 
initial GDP I I I   
human capital     I 
other macro variables I I I   
physical capital I I I I 
labor force growth I I I I 
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Table 5: Overview of estimated growth effects of consumption and property taxes 
Study 
A
rn
ol
d 
(2
00
8)
 
A
rn
ol
d 
(2
00
8)
 
A
rn
ol
d 
(2
00
8)
 
A
rn
ol
d 
(2
00
8)
 
A
rn
ol
d 
(2
00
8)
 
Tax measures % total tax % total tax % total tax % total tax % total tax 
Log / level p.c. GDP  (in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
p.c. GDP  
(in logs) 
Tax categories 
Consumption 
0.93 
0.74 0.92 2.16 n/a 
Property 1.45 1.55 2.71 0.71 
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'level' variables 
total exp.           
tax revenue I I I I I 
deficit         
productive 
expenditure         
non-productive exp.         
other expenditure         
government cons.         
government 
investment         
transfers           
Included (I) / omitted (O) 'tax mix' variables 
distortionary / direct O O      
non-dist. / indirect         
other revenue / tax         
personal     O I I 
corporate    I O I 
consumption I I I I  O 
property I   I   I  I  I  
Included (I) 'control' variables 
initial GDP           
human capital I I I I I 
other macro variables         
physical capital I I I I I 
labor force growth I I I I I 
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Table 6: Overview of time series studies and estimates (net tax measures) 
Paper Data 
Specification Estimated Effects
Identification 
strategy 
Offsetting 
change  
Time 
horizon16 
(Peak) tax 
multiplier17 Comments 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) 
U.S., 1947 – 
2009, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 12 quarters -0.99   
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) 
U.S., 1947 – 
2009, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 3 quarters 0.3  Estimated tax multiplier refers to recessions 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) 
U.S., 1947 – 
2009, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 2 quarters -0.50  Estimated tax multiplier refers to expansions 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) U.S., 1960 – 1997, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti 
spending 
response 
small 
5 quarters -0.78  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) U.S., 1960 – 1997, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti 
spending 
response 
small 
7 quarters -1.33  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) U.S., 1960 – 1997, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 
6 to 7 
quarters 
-0.8 to  
-1.5  Anticipated shocks 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2006, quarterly sign restriction deficit 
4 to 6 
quarters -1.2 to -1.9  
Caldara and Kamps (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2006, quarterly recursive spending 14 quarters 1.6  
Caldara and Kamps (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2006, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti spending 14 quarters 1.6  
Caldara and Kamps (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2006, quarterly sign restriction spending 20 quarters -1.6  
Claus et al. (2006) 
New Zealand, 
1982 – 2004, 
quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti 
small spending 
response 
1 – 3 
quarters -0.25 to 0.22 
Different results arise due to different trend 
specifications 
                                                 
16 Depending on the paper, the number of quarters to reach the peak response is an approximation from the impulse response function when the exact value is not reported in the paper. 
17 Depending on the paper, the tax multiplier may be an approximation from the impulse response function when the exact value is not reported in the paper.  
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Paper Data 
Specification Estimated Effects 
Identification 
strategy 
Offsetting 
change  
Time 
horizon16 
(Peak) tax 
multiplier17 Comments 
de Castro and Hernández de 
Cos (2008) 
Spain, 1980 – 
2004, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 
approx. 28 
quarters -.125   
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy, 1982 – 2004, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 
5 to 8 
quarters 0.08 to 0.16 
Tax multiplier refers to GDP net of public 
consumption 
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2000, quarterly sign restriction ? 10 quarters -0.5  
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2000, quarterly sign restriction ? 14 quarters -0.2 Anticipated shock 
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2000, quarterly sign restriction deficit 15 quarters -0.5  
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) U.S., 1955 – 2000, quarterly sign restriction spending 12 quarters -0.78   
Perotti (2004) Canada, 1960 – 2001, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 6 quarters -0.5   
Perotti (2004) Germany, 1960 – 1989, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 6 quarters -0.7  
Perotti (2004) UK, 1960 – 2001, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 9 quarters 0.25   
Perotti (2004) U.S., 1960 – 2001, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 7 quarters -0.5  
Perotti (2004) Australia, 1960 – 2001, quarterly 
Blanchard and 
Perotti ? 4 quarters 0.5 Anticipated shock 
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Table 7: Overview of time series studies and estimates (total tax measures) 
Paper Data 
Specification Estimated Effects
Identification 
strategy 
Offsetting 
change  
Time 
horizon 
(Peak) tax 
multiplier18 Comments 
Arin and Koray (2006) Canada, 1960 – 1999, quarterly recursive ? 7 quarters -0.16   
Barro and Redlick (2009) U.S., 1950 – 2006, annual IV ? 4 quarters -1.14 
Estimates based on effects of change in 
marginal tax rates on per capita growth 
Favero and Giavazzi (2010) U.S., 1950 – 2007, quarterly narrative ? 9 quarters -1  Multiplier refers to fiscal VAR specification 
Favero and Giavazzi (2010) U.S., 1950 – 2007, quarterly 
Blanchard 
and Perotti ? 10 quarters -1  
Marcellino (2002) Italy, 1981 – 2001, semiannual 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
small spending 
response  3 quarters 1  
Mertens and Ravn (2009) U.S., 1947 – 2006, quarterly narrative no 10 quarters -2 only baseline specification 
Mertens and Ravn (2009) U.S., 1947 – 2006, quarterly narrative no 8 quarters -1.5  Anticipated shock 
Perotti (2011) U.S., 1945 – 2009, quarterly narrative ? 12 quarters 
-1.32 to  
-1.68 
Tax multiplier point estimate which may not 
coincide with peak; IV specifications only  
Perotti (2011) U.S., 1945 – 2009, quarterly narrative ? 12 quarters -1.68 Anticipated shock 
Romer and Romer (2010) U.S., 1947 – 2007, quarterly narrative  no 10 quarters 
-2.93 to  
-3.08   
Romer and Romer (2010) U.S., 1947 – 2007, quarterly narrative  mostly deficit 10 quarters 2.48  
 
 
Table 8: Overview of time series studies and estimates (disaggregated tax measures) 
Paper Data 
Specification Estimated Effects 
Identification 
strategy 
Offsetting 
change  Tax variable Time horizon 
(Peak) tax 
multiplier Comments 
Arin and Koray (2005) U.S., 1959 – 2001, quarterly recursive 
spending 
response not 
significant  
indirect tax 
revenue  7 quarters negative   
Arin and Koray (2005) U.S., 1959 – 2001, quarterly recursive no 
corporate tax 
revenue 3 quarters negative  
                                                 
18 Depending on the paper, the tax multiplier may be an approximation from the impulse response function when the exact value is not reported in the paper.  
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Paper Data 
Specification Estimated Effects 
Identification 
strategy 
Offsetting 
change  Tax variable Time horizon 
(Peak) tax 
multiplier Comments 
Arin and Koray (2006) Canada, 1960 – 1999, quarterly recursive no 
indirect tax 
revenue 6 quarters -0.09  
Arin and Koray (2006) Canada, 1960 – 1999, quarterly recursive no 
corporate tax 
revenue 3 quarters 0.06   
Arin and Koray (2006) Canada, 1960 – 1999, quarterly recursive no 
personal 
income tax 
revenue  
4 quarters 0.05   
Arin and Koray (2006) Canada, 1960 – 1999, quarterly recursive no 
social security 
tax revenue 6 quarters 0.01   
de Castro and Hernández de 
Cos (2008) 
Spain, 1980 – 
2004, quarterly 
Blanchard 
and Perotti no direct taxes 25 quarters -0.2   
de Castro and Hernández de 
Cos (2008) 
Spain, 1980 – 
2004, quarterly 
Blanchard 
and Perotti no 
social security 
contributions 28 quarters 0.2   
 
